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Abstract
In this note, I derive the asymptotic relation verified by oligopolists’ iso-profit
curves within Cournot’s game. Thereafter, I provide an economic rationale for such
a mathematical relation. The results of this exploration suggest that for each firm
the asymptotes of the iso-profit curves convey the boundaries beyond which output
competitors become net purchasers of the good supplied in the market.
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1 Introduction
Cournot’s (1838) output game is one of the most influential model of oligopoly. As it
is well known, in the standard version of this framework a limited set of firms compete
one another for the quantity of output supplied in the market of a given good without
knowing the production decisions of their competitors.1 The model predicts that firms
will not coordinate their output decisions by achieving an output array that in terms of
profits results in being inferior with respect to the one that would be achieved in the
case of (monopolistic) coordination. Extensive reviews can be found (inter alia) in Varian
(1992) and Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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1Hahn (1987) and, more recently, Guerrazzi (2012) use this theoretical setting to frame a problem of
efficiency-wage competition.
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This simple framework has been developed in different directions. For example, un-
der product differentiation, Sing and Vives (1984) show that Cournot competition with
substitutes is the dual of Bertrand (1883) competition with complements and viceversa.
Moreover, Kopel (1996) explores the implications of different out-of-equilibrium adjust-
ments towards the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, exploiting a spatial strategic frame-
work, Mayer (2000) analyses Cournot (1838) output competition by allowing for different
production costs across locations.
In this note, I develop a not-widely stressed feature of Cournot’s (1838) game. Specifi-
cally, under the assumption that there are only two firms, I derive the asymptotic relation
that holds for oligopolists’ iso-profit curves. Thereafter, I provide an economic rationale
for such a mathematical relation. The results of this theoretical exploration reveal that
for each firm iso-profit curves’ asymptotes convey the boundaries beyond which output
competitors become net purchasers of the good supplied in the market.
The note is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the mathematics of Cournot’s (1838)
game. Section 3 provides an economic rationale for the asymptotic relation that bounds
iso-profit curves. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Mathematics
Suppose that in the market of the Q good takes place a quantity-competition between
two firms indexed by i = 1, 2. In this market, the function of (inverse) total demand is
given by
p =M −Q (1)
where Q is given by the sum of the output produced by two firms, i.e., q1 + q2, while M
is a positive constant that conveys the reservation price of the concerned good.
2.1 Firm 1’s problem
Firm 1’s reaction curve can be derived by solving the following problem:
max
q1
pi1 ≡ (M − q1 − q2) q1 − Cq1 (2)
where C > 0 is the value of the average and marginal cost that I assume equal for both
firms.
The first-order condition (FOC) for problem in (2) is given by
2
∂pi1
∂q1
=M − C − 2q1 − q2 = 0 (3)
As a consequence, the reaction curve of firm 1 has the following (linear) specification:
q1 =
1
2
(M − C − q2) or q2 =M − C − 2q1 (4)
In other words, the reaction function provides the output best response of firm 1 for
each possible level of output produced by firm 2. Its negative slope suggests that for each
firm the output produced by the competitor is a strategic substitute. This means that
whenever firm 2 increases (decreasesI its output offer, it is in the best interst of firm 1 to
reduce (increase) its production level.
Taking into account the result in (2), firm 1’s iso-profit curves are parametric equations
like the one that follows:
q2 (pi1, q1) =M − C − q1
(
1 +
pi1
q21
)
(5)
where pi1 is a positive constant.
Considering different levels of pi1, i.e., different firm 1’s level of profit, the parametric
equation in (5) represents a set of hyperbola that can be traced out in a (q1, q2) diagram
whose domain of definition is given by {q1 ∈ ℜ+ : q1 6= 0}.
The asymptotes of (5) can be derived as follows. First, the limit
lim
q1→0+
M − C − q1
(
1 +
pi1
q21
)
= −∞ (6)
conveys that
q1 = 0 (7)
is a vertical asymptote for the set of hyperbola in (5). Second, the limit
lim
q1→+∞
M − C − q1
(
1 +
pi1
q21
)
= −∞ (8)
suggests that (5) might have an oblique asymptote of the following linear form:
q2 = n+mq1 (9)
where n is the vertical intercept while m is the slope of the asymptote itself.
The parameters of the linear function in (9) can be found as follows:
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m = lim
q1→+∞
M − C − q1
(
1 + pi1
q2
1
)
q1
= −1 (10)
n = lim
q1→+∞
M − C − q1
(
1 +
pi1
q21
)
−mq1 =M − C (11)
Taking into account the result in (10) and (11), (9) becomes
q2 =M − C − q1 (12)
An illustration is given in figure 1.
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2q
CM −
2
CM −0
Figure 1: Asymptotes of firm 1’s iso-profit curves.
It is worth noting that higher (lower) values of pi1 lead to lower (higher) iso-profit
curves. Moreover, the diagram in figure 1 shows that each iso-profit curve reaches its
maximum at the intersection point with the reaction curve in (4). This result can be
formally proved as follows. First, taking into account that
∂
M − C − q1
(
1 + pi1
q2
1
)
∂q1
= 0⇔ q1 = ±
√
pi1 (13)
Thereafter, the equality
4
M − C − q1
(
1 +
pi1
q21
)
=M − C − 2q1 (14)
holds for the same values of q1 conveyed in (13).
The same conclusion can be also achieved by exploiting a graphical argument. Con-
sider the diagram in figure 2.
1q
2q
CM −
2
CM −0
0
2q
P
Figure 2: Intersection between iso-profit and reaction curves.
The situation illustrated in figure 2 is inconsistent with the definition of reaction curve
detailed in (4). Suppose that firm 2’s output is equal to q02. Thereafter, if the iso-profit
curve does not reach its maximum level in P , then the reaction curve does not provide
either the output best response of firm 1.
2.2 Firm 2’s problem
Firm 2’s reaction curve can be derived by solving the following problem:
max
q2
pi2 ≡ (M − q1 − q2) q2 − Cq2 (15)
The FOC for problem in (15) is given by
∂pi2
∂q2
=M − C − 2q2 − q1 = 0 (16)
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As a consequence, the reaction curve of firm 2 has the following specification:
q2 =
1
2
(M − C − q1) or q1 =M − C − 2q2 (17)
Taking into account the result in (14), firm 2’s iso-profit curves are as follows:
q1 (pi2, q2) =M − C − q2
(
1 +
pi2
q22
)
(18)
where pi2 is a positive constant.
Rotating the (q1, q2) diagram with respect to the vertical axis and following the pro-
cedure implemented for firm 1, it is possible to show that
q2 = 0 (19)
is a horizontal asymptote for the set of hyperbola in (18) while
q2 =M − C − q1 (20)
is its oblique asymptote.2
An illustration is given in figure 3.
1q
2q
CM −
0
2
CM −
CM −
Figure 3: Asymptotes of firm 2’s iso-profit curves.
2As far as a (q1, q2) diagram is concerned, the line such that q2 = 0 is a horizontal asymptote for (18).
6
It is worth noting that higher (lower) values of pi2, lead the iso-profit curves to shift
towards left (right).
2.3 Nash equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium of Cournot’s (1838) game is found in the point of intersection
between the reaction curves of the 2 firms. See figure 4.
1q
2q
CM −
2
CM −0
2
CM −
CM −
C
C
2q
C
1q
Figure 4: Nash equilibrium of Cournot’s game.
It is worth noting that in the Nash equilibrium of Cournot’s (1838) game there are
two iso-profit curves that intersect each other. Obviously, this means that the Nash
equilibrium is non-cooperative.3 Moreover, under the assumption that each firm reacts
to the output of the other with a lag of one period, i.e., assuming that the two firms play
Cournot’s(1838) game as a game of alternate output offer, it is possible to show that the
Nash equilibrium is stable.4 In other words, starting from an arbitrary allocation different
from
{
qC1 , q
C
2
}
, the output supply of the 2 firms will converge towards the point where
the reaction functions intersect each other.
Taking into account the results in (4) and (17), the (identical) output level produced
by the two firms in the Nash equilibrium is given by
3Indeed, cooperation would require tangency of isoprofit curves.
4Formally,
∣∣∣∂q1∂q2
∣∣∣
∣∣∣ ∂q2∂q1
∣∣∣ = ∣∣− 1
2
∣∣ ∣∣− 1
2
∣∣ = 1
4
< 1 (e.g. Kopel 1996).
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qCi =
M − C
3
i = 1, 2 (21)
Furthermore, taking into account the results in (2), (15) and (21), the (identical) profit
level achieved by the two firms in the Nash equilibrium is given by
piCi =
(
M − C
3
)2
i = 1, 2 (22)
3 An economic rationale
The asymptotic relationships derived in section 2 can be also rationalized from an eco-
nomic point of view. In what follows, I consider the situation of firm 1. Obviously, the
argument for firm 2 is a specular reflection.
First, consider the vertical asymptote in (7). Take a given level of profit - say pi01 - with
its iso-profit curve. Whenever firm 1 produces a very low output level (e.g. near to zero),
pi01 can be actually achieved if and only if firm 2 produces the output level conveyed by
(5). For a given level of q1, firm 1’s profit increases if and only if the output level produced
by firm 2 decreases. In the limit, for values of pi01 above a certain threshold - and taking
q1 as constant, it becomes necessary for firm 2 to put forward a negative output supply
(i.e. become a net purchaser of the good) in order to actually achieve those profit levels.
Furthermore, consider the oblique asymptote in (12). Taking into account the result
in (1), it can be easily verified that that (12) traces out all the pairs (q1, q2) such that the
price of the good is equal to the marginal and average cost. In the theoretical framework
developed in this note, price values in the neighbourhood of the average and marginal
cost allow to reach positive profits if and only if firm 2 makes a negative output supply,
i.e., if and only if firm 2 becomes a net purchaser of the good. Obviously, the higher pi1,
the higher the output demand from firm 2.
4 Concluding remarks
In this note, I derive the asymptotic relation that holds for oligopolists’ iso-profit curves
within Cournot’s (1938) game. Thereafter, I provide an economic rationale for such a
mathematical relation. The results of this theoretical exploration suggest that for each
firm iso-profit curves’ asymptotes convey the boundaries beyond which output competitors
become net purchasers of the good supplied in the market.
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